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Introduction
One of the most important questions confronting every acade-
mic discipline is how it identifi es and sometimes even defi nes its 
objects of research and itself as a discipline. Scholars of history, 
politics, mathematics, medicine, chemistry as well as of every 
other fi eld of knowledge face exactly the same problem. It is gene-
rally expected that those doing research in philosophical aesthe-
tics should have a conception of what is ‘the aesthetic’ (so neatly 
referred to in German as das Ästhetische), ‘aesthetic experience’, 
‘aesthetic features’ and ‘aesthetic terms’ – or whether such things 
exist at all – and also of what the discipline focusing on such 
problems, i.e., aesthetics, consists.
A typical way of outlining aesthetics, both as an object of re-
search and as a way of doing research, is to postulate borderlines 
for it. In so doing, one makes use of a spatial metaphor according 
to which aesthetics is conceived of as an area or a fi eld inside of 
which certain things exist, with everything else being excluded. 
By drawing borderlines one wishes to separate aesthetics from 
other ‘fi elds’ and the phenomena that belong to them. 
Although this way of thinking is fairly common and it feels 
easy to adopt it, it has consequences that are apt to blur our un-
derstanding of certain features of aesthetic practices and the dis-
cipline of aesthetics.
My aim is to (1) analyze the metaphor of the boundary in aes-
thetics a bit more deeply, (2) point out some diffi culties that arise 
when we use it and (3) suggest another, more useful metaphor.
Borderline metaphors
When one talks about concrete, often visually detectable borders 
the concept is very easy to understand. A borderline is something 
that separates, say, one building site from another. On one side 
of the border the land and the buildings are my property, outside 
of it they belong to someone else. Such a borderline can easily 
be made visible with a fence or a ditch. A fence might have been 
made because it signals that the boundary is not meant to be 
crossed without a permission. In that case, the border is intended 
to be tight: trespassers might be unwanted for they are thought 
to be harmful, whereas fl ies and butterfl ies are ignored because 
they cannot do any harm – they may cross the border. Here, the 
borderline – even if it is connected with a fairly abstract ethical 
and juridical system – is very concrete and easy to discern.
NET 32 2005 Text.indd   49 06-03-17   14.53.56
50 ossi  naukkarinen
1 The interpretation of metaphors 
presented by Lakoff and Johnson is only 
one possibility. A good overview on the 
fi eld of metaphor research can be found 
in Enzenberg 1998.
2 There are other schemas as well, 
such as the source-path-goal schema; 
on them see Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 
chapter 3.
Such concrete, tangible borderlines also function as the source 
for metaphorical uses of the concept. In many cases the border 
metaphor is used when no literal expression for the thing is ques-
tion can be found or when one wants to make use of an unusual 
expression. One can say, for example, that “people should have 
some borders they do not cross in their behavior” or, to use a 
different expression with practically the same meaning in this 
context, “imagination has its limits”. Dying, also, is sometimes re-
ferred to by the expression “crossing the ultimate border”.
One should note that there is nothing unusual in using meta-
phors. On the contrary, they are in use all the time, and this text 
is full of them if one reads it carefully. George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson (1980 and especially 1999) have showed this very clearly. 
One uses metaphors almost inevitably when talking about such 
abstract issues as time, change, knowledge, love, and the like. Ac-
cording to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphors are expressions that 
have their origins in physical, embodied, sensorimotor experi-
ences of the world, in experiences we all have because we live in 
this particular world through our bodies. Such experiences are, 
so to speak, source-domains which structure our understanding 
in other domains, called target-domains; we also use conceptual 
tools acquired in physical interaction with the world in situations 
where we do not use them for discussing such interactions as 
such. With their help we make sense of many other things as 
well. Because we know what it is to move our body or to travel 
(source-domain), we can think about time (target-domain), too, 
as something that moves onwards, even if it is hard to say what 
that might mean, taken literally. In addition, when something 
changes, the process can be thought of as movement; if I change 
my mind it can be conceived of (metaphorically) as me moving 
from one opinion to another. Still further, if I know something, I 
can describe it as grasping it.1
The so-called basic or primary metaphors, i.e. metaphors that 
are very often used, can be seen to form groups, and one impor-
tant group follows the so-called container schema.2 The expres-
sion ‘container schema’ refers to our habit of conceptualizing 
things with the help of metaphors based on our knowledge of 
things that can literally contain other things, like containers, box-
es and envelopes do. For example, we can conceive of conceptual 
categories as enclosures, or e-mail messages as packages.
Something like the container schema is exactly what is often 
used when we conceive of aesthetics with the help of boundary 
metaphors, with or without the word ‘borderline’. Then, we see aes-
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thetics as something that contains something and excludes some-
thing else. And the container has its borders or limits, so to speak. 
It is easy to fi nd expressions which are connectable with border 
metaphors that can be classifi ed in this schema: “Aesthetics is a fi eld 
of knowledge that deals with…” “Problems of aesthetics include…” 
“In aesthetics…” The theme of the annual meeting of the Nordic So-
ciety of Aesthetics in May 2003 was The Borderlines of Aesthetics.
It is possible, and even probable, that one cannot conceive of 
aesthetics at all without using some metaphors, but the point is 
that one has to be very careful with choosing them because they 
all have consequences for our thinking. I believe, for example, 
that for some purposes there are better alternatives to thinking 
about the aesthetic in terms of borders.
The problems of boundary metaphors for aesthetics
On an abstract theoretical level, drawing borders for aesthetics 
seems possible. One can say, in a common way, that the fi eld of 
aesthetics includes, say, questions about the philosophy of art 
and beauty, and that ethical or ecological questions do not belong 
there. Because environmental aesthetics is often interested in 
such ‘other’ questions, it has sometimes seen to be situated some-
where on the borders between aesthetics and some other fi eld.
But one faces problems right away when one moves any clos-
er to more concrete and detailed examples. Where, exactly, is 
the border between art or beauty and something else in Robert 
Musil’s novel Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften? Where, if we dis-
cuss a painting by Gerhard Richter, are aesthetic issues situated? 
Which things belong to which side of the border in assessing a 
view in the Helsinki archipelago? Indeed, on which basis can we 
omit, say, an ethical or ecological question anywhere?
Let’s attempt to clarify the issues by considering a strawberry 
red Toyota Corolla sedan from the year 1993.
First of all, even if the chosen example is a car, it could be 
anything else. This reminds us of the fact that it is possible to 
talk about the aesthetics of anything whatsoever: of cars, human 
beings, fl owers, musical compositions, paintings, landscapes, 
alli gators, wars, houses, and marriages. This, I believe, has been 
widely accepted for a long time now. The simple but important 
consequence of this notion is that the borderlines of aesthetics 
many wish to fi nd are unable to separate some particular types 
of objects from any others. Thus, the metaphor is useless in this 
sense because that sort of borders simply do not exist.
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Secondly, when we talk about a concrete, individual case, say, 
about a particular car, the discussion can, of course, touch upon 
aesthetic questions but it is not normally limited to them. They 
are not the only relevant questions, and other issues tend to come 
along. When it comes to our Corolla, we can consider whether it is 
good looking or dull, whether we like its color or how it continues 
the design tradition of Japanese cars. But very soon we normally 
end up talking about how it feels to drive it, how expensive it is, 
whether it is durable, whether it uses lots of gasoline, whether 
it is safe, whose it is, how old it is, etc. We might also ask why it 
seems to lack any real character when compared to more unusual 
cars, or whether we can know something about the owner simply 
through his or her car?
Which of these are aesthetic issues, strictly speaking? Perhaps 
the one about its looks? Why? Rather than trying to answer these 
questions right now, I would like to come back to them later. The 
point here is that no matter which issues are thought of as aes-
thetic, other issues tend to affect (our ideas about) them. We may 
think that a Corolla looks dull because there are so many of them, 
which, in turn, has to do with its price and with the technology 
one gets for that price. If we like the color, it may be because it is in 
fashion. However, fashion is a very complex social and economic 
phenomenon and it is not limited to aesthetics in any sense.
Furthermore, many fi nd Corollas durable, relatively cheap and 
perhaps even dull, but all of these notions have to do with exactly 
the same materials and technology that are also related to the 
car’s safety, driving feel and so on: there is nothing in the car that 
can be related to its aesthetics only – no material, function, form, 
technological solution or anything else. There is no part or aspect 
of the Corolla that could be separated with clear-cut borders and 
identifi ed as one that concerns aesthetics and aesthetics only.
To make a comparison, it has been shown that aesthetic con-
ceptions of human beings are normally intertwined with our 
overall conception of them. To put it simply: if we consider some-
one beautiful we tend to consider him or her morally good, intel-
ligent and pleasant, as well, and vice versa. It has also been found 
that good-looking persons tend to get help very easily, say, when 
they are lost in a city, and they also get better grades at school. 
Moreover, they are noticed more often and doctors spend more 
time with them when they are in hospitals. There are exceptions 
of course, but this is the general, somewhat baffl ing tendency. 
Thus, our aesthetic opinions of people affect what we think of 
them and how we treat them in general, and our ideas about how 
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intelligent or morally good someone is affects our idea of that 
how handsome, beautiful or ugly he or she is.3 Aesthetics is an 
important factor there, but it is the whole we are talking about, 
the whole person, and not some circumscribed part or aspect of 
him or her. A clear distinction or boundary between different 
aspects does not seem to exist.
The same tendency can be found in discourse on art, of course. 
In criticism it is perfectly normal to deal with such questions as 
who made the piece in question, what else has (s)he done, what 
material it is made of and was it an expensive project to produce 
it. All of these questions might easily affect our conception of, 
say, the beauty of a piece. They might also, for example, offer rea-
sons for us to take a closer look at it in the fi rst place. On the other 
hand, aesthetic issues are not always seen as very important in 
art. Joseph Kosuth is not alone in believing that the supposed bor-
ders of aesthetics do not have much to do with borders of art.
All in all, clear-cut boundaries between aesthetic issues and other 
issues seem to be hard to fi nd. At least there seems to be heavy traf-
fi c across the borders, which seems to make them rather irrelevant.
Actually, of course, the fact that other issues tend to affect our 
ideas about the aesthetic ones does not mean that we should not 
postulate such borders in theory, analytically, if we want to.
The question is, however, do we need them? Should we want 
them? The problem they cause in the context of actual, concrete 
cases is that if we want to keep the discussion within certain 
boundaries and limit ourselves to aesthetic issues only, the whole 
discussion tends to become very narrow and lots of energy is 
expended on keeping an eye on the borders. But do we lose some-
thing if we talk about cars, human beings or paintings from a 
variety of perspectives? In fact, this is how we usually talk about 
these things. We are interested in their production history, mate-
rials, ecology, ethics and so on. I would claim that taking a wider 
perspective on anything makes understanding and experiencing 
it richer; focusing on aesthetics only is to focus on one side only 
and to leave the whole untouched. Thus, the problem with the 
borderline metaphor, in the worst case, is that it makes our per-
spective too narrow to be relevant.4
Thirdly, there are still other problems with the border meta-
phor. Namely, it is important to see that the borders are blurred 
even when we use simple terminology. Analytic postulating of 
borders also faces problems here: how can we describe and refer 
to aesthetic issues, and to them only, if we lack a distinctive vo-
cabulary for aesthetic considerations? We do not always speak of 
3 See Patzer 1985 and Kaiser 1999.
4 Similar ideas have been presen-
ted in many other contexts as well, of 
course. The notion resembles the ones 
presented by some Marxist and feminist 
critics whose target is the narrowly con-
ceived modernist conception of art.
NET 32 2005 Text.indd   53 06-03-17   14.54.03
54 ossi  naukkarinen
beauty, ugliness, etc. but perhaps say only that a work of art or a 
car is good or fascinating. There is no certainty of the presence 
of aesthetics in such discourses in the fi rst place, but it may be 
there as a part of a whole. However, the words used do not draw 
any clear limits here. Consider the much-used expression ‘cool’; 
it does not respect any academically set borders for aesthetics. ‘A 
cool car’ can mean almost anything positive: well kept, expensive, 
uncommon, fast… Often such expressions have something to do 
with aesthetics but it may be hard to pinpoint what exactly.
Moreover, even the terms that are very often thought of as be-
ing at the core of aesthetics, like beauty or ugliness, schön, kaunis, 
bella or vacker, can be used with other meanings that are not 
aesthetic in any strict sense. In sports, one hears this often: one 
can “make a beautiful goal” and it means much more than just a 
good-looking goal in a narrow sense. It can be done, e.g., at an im-
portant moment considering the result of the game. On the other 
hand, a deed may be ugly, meaning that it is morally suspect, and 
so on. It is evident that this often used, non-distinctive terminol-
ogy makes the idea of borderlines fairly peculiar.
Lastly, we often use no words at all. Talking, analyzing, reception 
with verbal language is only one option. Considering our Corolla 
again, we might ask where and when verbal aesthetics analysis 
takes place? It may take place in planning, but not necessarily even 
there, for nowadays planning is likely to be done by using visual 
computer software. There, verbal language comes up only occa-
sionally. When actually driving our Corolla, verbal language is un-
necessary. When driving, one does not have to talk. This does not 
necessarily mean that we are completely unaware of the aesthetic 
dimension of driving: we may try to turn a corner nicely and pay 
attention to the rhythm of the traffi c. But then the aesthetic aspect 
is only one possible aspect of the overall situation and we do not of-
ten express this aspect verbally. Especially when we observe some-
one else driving, the presence of aesthetics is uncertain. By simply 
looking at someone we cannot be sure whether the driver is paying 
attention to the aesthetic dimensions of his or her action. We can, 
of course, project our own aesthetic ideas on him.
I tend to think that the very existence of aesthetics is heavily 
dependent on the verbal language we use, and when it is not used, 
it remains much more unclear whether it is noticed – in thinking 
or acting – in the fi rst place. It becomes detectable as a thing we 
can identify as aesthetic only when we become conscious of it, of-
ten after we have done something, and this sort of consciousness 
is typically connected with verbal language. At such times, iden-
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tifying is naming.5 What a totally ineffable, wordless aesthetics 
would be – something that would not be at all, even in principle, 
connectable to verbal expressions that link the things in question 
to the tradition of aesthetics – is unclear.
But if we accept that aesthetically colored deeds and actions 
exist that need not be (but can be) verbally connected to the tradi-
tion of aesthetics at the moment when they take place, it seems 
hard to say where their aesthetic quality begins and ends. Driving 
a car or dancing as acts do not draw such borderlines (or many 
other borderlines either, for that matter). If one wants to have 
borders one necessarily needs to use language to draw them. For 
that purpose one typically makes use of theories – and we have 
just seen that it is not very easy to defend the idea of borders 
there either if one connects, as one should, the theory to practices 
of criticism and nonverbal deeds.
It seems that when we do or discuss something, aesthetics is not 
typically the central category we operate with. We talk about works 
of art and we want to understand them wholly. We meet people, 
we cook food, buy a car and so on, and all of these activities can 
be of aesthetic interest but our interest is not restricted to aesthet-
ics. There are museums and galleries for art but not for ‘aesthetic 
things’; to establish one would be an interesting enterprise!
I believe that it is diffi cult to fi nd any boundaries for aesthetics 
that would separate aesthetic objects or language usages from 
non-aesthetic ones. Typically, aesthetic issues seem to be dis-
cussed as aspects or shades of the whole, sometimes they are 
not discussed clearly at all but only hinted at, and other issues 
affect them. They are not a separate category. All this is obvious 
in concrete cases of aesthetic practices, and I would claim that 
this should be taken into consideration in the theory of aesthetics 
as well. The borderline metaphor seems to suggest the contrary, 
and that is why I want to present another alternative.
Everything that I have said this far does not mean that aesthetic 
issues in our daily conversations and aesthetics as an academic 
discipline totally lack their own identity. Aesthetics is different 
from other disciplines. But the idea of an essential difference 
– one without which we cannot manage if we want to identify 
anything – does not need the idea of borders.
Taste of aesthetics
I would favor another metaphor, one that has been used in the 
history of aesthetics before but in a somewhat different way. Ac-
5 I do not wish to make any universal 
claims by this. I only believe that this is 
often the case.
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cording to it, aesthetics – or the aesthetic, das Ästhetische – is a 
tone, fl avor or a shade in a totality, rather than a distinct area or 
totality on its own.
Following this path, assessing aesthetics – or the aesthetic – is 
closer to tasting food or wine: aesthetics is a part of the whole in 
the way saltiness or sweetness is a part of food or a drink. It can-
not be pointed out that sweetness is exactly here, but not there. 
It is everywhere throughout whatever it is we are tasting. Such 
qualities as saltiness or sweetness have no borderlines between 
them and other tastes even if they have a distinctive fl avor. In ad-
d ition, aesthetics could be compared to having shades of color: it 
is more like a tint of yellow or blue in green than a separate patch 
of color. Likewise, aesthetics does differ from other nuances but 
is not separable from them.
Here, of course, I return to the old metaphor of taste, but only 
in certain respects. We need not adopt the ideas of standards of 
taste, the notion that something might be in ‘good taste’ or ‘bad 
taste’. Consequently the problems of the relativity of taste and of 
the role of senses, knowledge, education, etc. in taste judgments 
must remain unresolved for now.6
The important thing to note is that taste, now, does not refer 
to a faculty possessed by certain, educated and sensitive persons. 
Anyone who is interested in wines learns to discern sweetness, 
age, the grape and so on, and this activity does not require a spe-
cial sensitivity – the taste is found in an active interaction with 
the wine. Of course, some are better at this than others but there 
is nothing mystical about the activity. One does not need a special 
mouth or nose to taste different fl avors.
Although someone might argue that wine-tasting is not for ev-
eryone, this is begging the questions. We all inevitably learn to 
discern numerous fl avors, as we must eat and drink something, 
wine or something else, in order to keep on living. Likewise, most 
of us necessarily learn to taste the aesthetic in one way or another 
when we grow up in our particular cultures. It is hard not to learn 
to form opinions on beauty, ugliness etc. A taste, a hue, a fl avor of 
an aesthetic sort is discerned in an interaction with things around 
us by anyone who is interested in it.
What makes tasting the aesthetic comparable to literal tasting 
done by the mouth and the nose is that in both we approach con-
crete wholes from many angles simultaneously and that there are 
no sharp borders between the angles. When we taste a portion of 
food we do discern differences between various fl avors: salt, gar-
lic, sage, basil and aceto balsamico, for example. In addition, we 
6 These and related issues have been 
dealt with lately by Gracyk 1990, Gro-
now 1997 and Korsmeyer 1999.
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can taste whether the food is fresh and sometimes even its price 
category (caviar). These are different aspects of taste but they are 
all in the taste, so to speak, without clear limits or boundaries be-
tween them. Of course, there are attributes we cannot taste at all 
(origins of salt, weight of the portion, e.g.), and we have to get 
information about these in some other way. But the point is that if 
we want to taste whether there is basil or sage in the food we just 
have to taste it: taste as taste cannot be assessed in any other way. 
It is not the same thing to ask the cook to provide this taste to us.
If we stretch the metaphor a bit further, we could think that 
we can taste other things in a similar way, too. These might in-
clude politics or ethics, which seem to be as impossible to identify 
with the idea of borders as aesthetics is. They, too, seem to be 
aspects of practically everything, aspects that are always waiting 
to be noticed. Then, there might be issues we taste and others like 
weight or price we measure and describe by exact numbers and 
clear-cut borders. All of these can be considered in the context of 
our Corolla.
Moreover, we cannot literally taste everything in the world, but 
all of the things we can taste have some sort of taste, be it good or 
bad, sweet or salty. If we compare this to tasting aesthetics, ethics 
or politics, some sort of aesthetics, ethics and politics can be found 
wherever one is able and willing to judge it. Actually, it is hard to 
think of anything in the context of which the taste of aesthetics 
– or of the aesthetic – could not be focused on and found to be 
beautiful, ugly, cool, dull or something else. If one thinks in terms 
of borderlines, this ubiquitousness can easily be lost.
If so then the question is how do we discern the taste of the 
aesthetic from other tastes? Here, we need to refer to the history 
of aesthetics, both in the sense of concrete cases and aesthetic the-
ory. We need to have some knowledge of the aesthetic discourse 
at large in order to taste whether something we encounter is re-
lated to it in some relevant way. If we talk about a car, we cannot 
measure whether it is cool and whether its coolness has some-
thing to do with beauty or something else that has been seen as 
having an aesthetic quality in our tradition before, but we have to 
assess it in a way that, to my mind, is comparable to tasting: we 
estimate it with our own senses and knowledge of things we have 
met before. Nobody can do this for us, for example by drawing a 
priori clear-cut and universal borderlines for coolness. We cannot 
measure most tastes either but we can still discern them with 
our senses. We taste aesthetics and ethics with the help of the 
knowledge of their history and through examples we know, as we 
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7 I have elaborated the idea of iden-
tifying aesthetic issues with the help of 
history in more detail in Naukkarinen 
1998. 
8 One technical way of putting this is 
to talk about the so-called supervenience 
of aesthetics.
taste garlic and sage through our previous knowledge about these 
spices and food in general.7
Why change?
Why is it so important to reconsider the boundary metaphor in 
discussions of aesthetics? Because metaphors affect our thinking 
and attitudes. They are not just ways of speaking or harmless 
artistic fi gures, but something with the help of which we make 
sense of the world. So, we must ask what difference the taste 
metaphor might make in our thinking of aesthetics? The stress is 
on the word ‘might’, of course, because no metaphor guarantees 
anything about our thinking, but just supports some options.
The most important benefi t of the taste metaphor is that 
when we use it in pondering aesthetic qualities, it is not easy to 
separate aesthetics from other issues. Tasting refers to assessing 
something in its totality: a food, wine or whatever. If we want to 
fi nd out how something tastes, we do not typically search for one 
particular taste – whether it has garlic or beauty in it – but we 
are interested in the totality; the whole is good, interesting, bor-
ing etc. because it has garlic or beauty in it in this particular way 
in relation to its other aspects. If we want to be profi cient in our 
ass essments we need to know the tradition in which these things 
rest. We cannot have taste in any serious sense for anything we 
meet for the fi rst time. Unlike garlic, however, aesthetics nowhere 
exists as a distinct species, but always occurs as mixed and along 
with other things.8
This makes aesthetics an important, intimate and inseparable 
part of a larger phenomenon. In principle, it cannot be put behind 
its own borders and then set aside when other, presumably more 
important issues are taken up. If we consider a whole, a totality, 
all of its aspects or dimensions should be taken into account and 
their relations to each other should be noticed. The taste meta-
phor helps us do this better than the borderline metaphor.
Another important aspect of the taste metaphor is that it does 
more to stress the corporeal, bodily nature of aesthetics than the 
border metaphor does. Tasting is often indulging in something, 
touching something with one’s lips, palate, tongue and throat, or 
smelling it. One takes this something inside of him and processes 
it with his whole body. At such time, one is in a very intimate 
relation with the thing being tasted. This tallies very well with 
the old notion that aesthetics is a ‘science of sensitive knowledge’ 
– aesthetic knowledge of the world cannot be had in any other 
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9 On the use of visual metaphors in 
the history of philosophy and sciences, 
see Jay 1994.
10 This article is a part of the re-
search project Aesthetics, Mobility, and 
Change (Academy of Finland 201402)
way than through one’s own senses, and that is true of tasting as 
well. Here, one moves away from visual metaphors, which have 
been very popular in many fi elds of knowledge, to a bodily meta-
phor.9 Borders, on the other hand, can be drawn on a map without 
being in close touch with a landscape, for example.
One must note, however, that no matter whether we choose 
the borderline or the taste metaphor, they both cause problems 
rather than resolve them. The taste approach only creates other 
problems, such as what makes the taste of the aesthetic differ 
from the taste of politics; how does metaphorical tasting differ 
from actual tasting; can aesthetics be assessed in any other way.
The advantage of the taste metaphor, in any case, is that it can 
remind us of this uncertainty and of these problems. It does not 
create the illusion that these problems can be solved for good by 
creating borders that exclude tough problems from the fi eld. We 
are bound to taste things again and again. Our experiences will dif-
fer over time and we cannot be absolutely sure whether we even 
share the same taste with others. With this metaphor we indicate 
our acceptance of the situation that aesthetics will remain a prob-
lem that we will have to ponder. There is no fi nal defi nition or a fi -
nal experience of it, no matter whether we are looking at aesthetic 
issues on the level of concrete cases or at aesthetics as a theoretical 
discipline: we taste both and ponder whether we are experiencing 
aesthetics or ethics, whether we are perhaps experiencing some-
thing else this time. Drawing clear-cut borders gives us too simple 
a picture of what is an on-going endless discussion.10
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